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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Article

VIII

§ 2

of

the

Utah

Constitution,

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (1987 & Supp. 1991) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err in directing a verdict in favor of
defendant Sharon's Cultural Educational Recreational Association
(SCERA) when the evidence presented clearly demonstrated that
plaintiff was either (1) defendant's employee whose remedies were
limited

by

Utah's

worker's

compensation

statute;

or

(2) a

trespasser who was owed no duty by defendant except to refrain from
willfully and intentionally injuring plaintiff.
In reviewing a trial court's directed verdict, this Court
" 'must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence
and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a
judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot
be sustained.'"

Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d

969f 971 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Management Comm. of Graystone
Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898
(Utah 1982) . )
The Supreme Court will generally not consider arguments raised
for the first time on appeal especially, as is the case here, where
this Court may have derived great benefit from the trial judge's
views on the issue and may have been persuaded by those views or
needs the trial court's examination to evaluate a question of fact.

See Zions First National Bank v. National American Title Insurance,
749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988).

Further, this Court will generally

not consider on appeal whether a plaintiff may proceed against a
defendant on a basis not raised in the complaint where the district
court limited its ruling to arguments raised below. See Allisen v.
American

Legion

Post

#134,

763

P.2d

806,

809

(Utah

1988).

Accordingly, since plaintiff's arguments on appeal concerning (1)
his urged "gratuitous servant" status and (2) worker's compensation
public policy concerns were not argued below or considered by the
trial court in reaching its conclusion, this Court should not
consider such arguments on appeal. See Zions First National Bank,
supra; Allisen, supra.
Assuming that this Court determines the trial court erred in
directing a verdict in this case, such error requires reversal only
if the Court concludes that absent the error there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the party claiming the
same.

State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989).

harmful

only

sufficiently

if
high

the
as

likelihood
to

of

undermine

a

different

[the

"An error is
outcome

appellate

confidence in the [trial court's determination]."

is

court's]

Crookstone v.

Fire Insurance Exchange, slip op. at P. 6, No. 880034 (filed
June 28, 1991) (citation omitted).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Other than case law, the following statutes are controlling
and are quoted in Appendix A:
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1985)
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (Supp. 1985)
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

This is an appeal from a directed

verdict ruling that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that
plaintiff was defendant's employee and as such was only entitled to
remedies provided by Utah's Worker's Compensation Statute.
B.

Course and Disposition of Proceeding Below.

Plaintiff

filed suit against defendant to recover damages for what he alleged
were injuries he sustained as a result of performing work for
defendant, namely using a power lawn mower to cut defendant's
lawns.
except

Prior to trial, all defendants settled with plaintiff
Sharon's Cultural Educational

Recreational

(SCERA), the sole defendant/appellee herein.

Association

Subsequent to the

presentation of evidence at trial, the court ruled that the
undisputed evidence presented by both plaintiff and defendant
demonstrated that (1) plaintiff was defendant's employee; (2) as
defendant's employee plaintiff's remedies were limited by Utah's
worker's compensation statute; (3) "[t]he evidence is without
dispute that there was some remuneration or compensation given to
[plaintiff] as a consequence of his relationship with [defendant]";
and (4) plaintiff's right to exercise privileges afforded volunteer
workers

at

defendant's

place

of

business

was

sufficient

to

constitute compensation under Utah's Worker's Compensation Act.
(See R. at 1077-78.)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

In July, 1986 plaintiff filed his complaint in this

action alleging in part that on or about June 21, 1985 plaintiff
was injured while operating defendant's lawn mower under the
3

supervision of defendant's maintenance manager.
plaintiff

plead

that

defendant

was

negligent

Specifically,
in

permitting

plaintiff, a minor, to operate a lawn mower in violation of labor
laws.

(See R. at 1-4.)
2.

Defendant answered plaintiff's complaint and specifically

alleged as a defense that "if it is established that plaintiff is
an employee of this defendant, the benefits provided by the Utah
Workman's Compensation Act are his exclusive remedy."

(See R. 22.)

Plaintiff newer responded to defendant's "employment defense" until
it was argued as part of defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
3.

Prior to trial plaintiff moved to publish his deposition

and that of his father.

(R. 587.)

As part of plaintiff's

deposition he testified that he had been working at the theater
before the day of the accident, mowing lawns, picking up cups,
emptying garbage cans and vacuuming.

Plaintiff had worked at

defendant's establishment on many occasions and plaintiff even
testified that he had mowed defendant's lawns quite a few times
before

the

day

of the

accident.

Plaintiff

also worked

at

defendant's establishment in the winter and plaintiff reiterated
that he often went to defendant's establishment to work with his
father.
4.

{See R. at 635, 634, 622, & 616.)
In his deposition published upon plaintiff's motion

plaintiff's

father

testified

that

plaintiff

had

worked

for

defendant both the summer before and the summer during which the
accident occurred.

In fact, plaintiff's father expressly noted

that as defendant's maintenance supervisor, if his sons had not

4

performed the work he would have had to hire someone else to
complete it for defendant.
5.

(See R. at 638.)

Prior to trial plaintiff submitted several motions in

limine to the court.

At least three of these motions were

supported by memoranda affirmatively reiterating that plaintiff was
a "volunteer worker" at defendant's establishment when he was
injured and that plaintiff was working under the supervision of his
father who was defendant's theater maintenance manager with the
responsibility to hire volunteer and paid workers for the care and
maintenance of defendant's grounds.
6.

As part

of a proposed

(See R. at 738, 742, 754.)
pretrial order

submitted by

plaintiff to the court, plaintiff expressly reiterated his claim
that he was a volunteer worker for defendant.
7.

(See R. at 931.)

At the beginning of trial plaintiff, through his counsel,

stated to the court that the evidence presented would demonstrate
that plaintiff was a volunteer worker for defendant.

(See R. 1091

at 76.)
8.

At

trial

plaintiff's

father

testified

that

he was

defendant's manager in charge of maintaining defendant's grounds
and that his two sons, including the plaintiff herein, were working
for defendant on the day plaintiff was injured.

(See R. 1092 at

301-02, 307, 319-23.)
9.

Plaintiff's father further testified that plaintiff was

a regular worker at defendant's establishment since he came every
day and worked for a couple of hours.

5

(See R. 1092 at 317.)

10.

Plaintiff's father stated that employment applications

were not necessarily required for volunteer workers.

(See R. 1092

at 319-23.)
11.

And plaintiff's father stressed that at the time of

plaintiff's injuries he was controlling plaintiff's activities not
in his individual capacity as plaintiff's
managerial capacity as defendant's manager.

father but in his
(See R. 1092 at 340-

44.)
12.

Defendant's president testified at trial that plaintiff's

father was indeed defendant's manager in charge of maintenance and
upkeep of the building and grounds.

He also testified that

plaintiff's father had authority to hire volunteers to work.

(See

R. 1092 at 365-67.)
13.

Defendant's president

further stated that only paid

employees were to operate lawn mowers or other hazardous equipment
at defendant's establishment.

He also noted that plaintiff's

father was aware of this policy, and that all volunteer workers
were to complete employment applications.
369.)

There

was

no

application

for

(See R. 1092 at 368plaintiff

on

file

in

defendant's office and defendant's president never saw plaintiff
operate a lciwn mower on defendant's premises.

(See R. 1092 at 371-

72.)
14.

Defendant's president opined that plaintiff was not a

staff member of defendant but was only working as an accommodation
to plaintiff's father.
15.

(See R. 1092 at 373-74.)

To prove he worked for defendant, plaintiff presented the

testimony of 13-year-old Paul Carter, another volunteer employee
6

for defendant.

Similar to plaintiff's situation, at the time of

plaintiff's injury Mr. Carter had also assisted defendant in
cleaning theaters and mowing lawns and had not filled out an
application for voluntary employment since he too knew plaintiff's
father.
16.

(See R. 1093 at 405-07.)
As part of his testimony at trial plaintiff himself

confirmed that he was able to swim in defendant's pool and view
movies at defendant's establishment for free and that he had
received payment from his father for mowing defendant's lawns.
(See R. 1093 at 413, 479.)
17.

As

part

of

defendant's

case

in

chief

defendant's

president testified that the only reason he had not submitted
plaintiff's application for worker's compensation benefits was due
to the fact that plaintiff's father had asked him not to do so.
(See R. 1093 at 481-83.)

Nevertheless, defendant's president

stated that defendant had worker's compensation insurance coverage
at

the time

of the accident, that

defendant

considered

its

volunteers staff members and that volunteers received compensation
for working at defendant's establishment in the form of free passes
to defendant's theater for the volunteer, his family, and a
personal friend, free passes to other movie theaters in Provo and
Orem, Utah for themselves and their friends, swimming privileges at
defendant's

swimming

pool, privileges

at

defendant's

outdoor

amphitheater, and discounts on all items purchased from defendant.
(See R. 1092 at 373; R. 1093 at 481-82, 496-99.) And in fact, said
compensation

was

a

part

of

defendant's

publication.

(See R. 1093 at 496.)
7

personnel

handbook

18.

Plaintiff's counsel conceded that plaintiff received

benefits from working at defendant's facility, namely opportunities
to utilize the facilities without charge, including attending
movies and swimming.

(See R. 1093 at 439-42.)

Nevertheless,

plaintiff claimed that he did not qualify as an employee of
defendant since he did not get paid.
19.

(See R. 1093 at 443.)

And as stated by the court, plaintiff's counsel alleged

that plaintiff's father, "acting with[in] the course and scope of
his employment, hired or employed, permitted, [plaintiff] to work;
directed his activities, [and] told [plaintiff] when to work."
(See R. 1093 at 444-45.)
20. Counsel for defendant moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that plaintiff's action was barred by the exclusive remedy
provisions of Utah's worker's compensation statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-60. Specifically, defendant argued that under the evidence
plaintiff was either defendant's employee and thus limited by the
provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act or was not acting in
any

authorized

capacity

for

defendant

and

was

therefore

a

trespasser, imposing no duty upon defendant as a matter of law
other than to refrain from intentionally and willfully injuring
plaintiff.
21.

(See R. 1093 at 433-34.)
In response, the court noted that being able to attend

movies without charge and having available the other benefits
indicated was certainly compensation within the meaning of Utah's
Worker's Compensation Act and this Court's previous case analyses.
(See R. 1093 at 443-44.)

8

22.

Although plaintiff tried to defuse this fact by arguing

that he was entitled to those benefits through his father's
employment with defendant, the court noted that plaintiff earned
those privileges in his own capacity and the fact that he may have
had duplicate privileges through his father was not determinative
as to whether or not plaintiff was defendant's employee.

(See R.

1093 at 507.)
23.

After hearing argument the court entered its directed

verdict, findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case,
ruling:
The court finds that under the facts presented,
[plaintiff] was an employee of [defendant], whether
characterized as a volunteer or otherwise as an employee,
and that as such, the remedies through which he is
entitled to recover are limited by the Workmen's
Compensation Statute.
The question of whether or not an employee arrangement
exists depends on several circumstances. The allegations
and the proof demonstrate that [plaintiff's father] was
himself an employee of [defendant] and that he was acting
as the maintenance manager for the theater grounds on
behalf of [defendant], he purported to exercise control
over the time, place and circumstances of the work or
services
that
were
performed
by
[plaintiff].
[Plaintiff's father] purported to exercise the right to
hire and fire employees and volunteers. Equipment was
furnished by [defendant] and supervision over the use of
the equipment was provided by [plaintiff's father].
The evidence is without dispute that there was some
remuneration or compensation given to [plaintiff] as a
consequence of his relationship with [defendant]. It
appears to the Court that [plaintiff's] right in his own
capacity to exercise privileges afforded to volunteer
workers at [defendant] was sufficient to constitute
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
(See R. 1077-78.)

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly directed a verdict in defendant's
favor inasmuch as all the evidence presented, including that
offered and urged as credible by plaintiff himself, clearly and
unequivocally demonstrated that plaintiff was defendant's employee
at the time of the injury and was thus limited to the remedies of
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act.
In the alternative, if the trial court erred in directing a
verdict,

the

error was

harmless

and there

is no reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable result for plaintiff absent such
error since if plaintiff was not defendant's employee, plaintiff
was a trespasser to defendant and, as such, was not entitled under
the law to protection from defendant above defendant's duty to
refrain from willfully or intentionally injuring plaintiff, which
duty was not breached here.
In other respects, plaintiff's novel argument on appeal that
this

Court

should

acknowledge

the

employment

category

of

"gratuitous servant" cannot be considered since it was not raised
to the trial court below; and such "gratuitous servant" employment
status is not otherwise recognized under Utah law.
Finally, since plaintiff himself insisted that his worker's
compensation

application

not

be

filed

with

the

Industrial

Commission plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain that this
Court should grant him relief or that he should not be bound by
provisions of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act when he himself
failed to seek the assistance of the Industrial Commission in

10

evaluating whether he was defendant's employee at the time of his
injury.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR GIVEN THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE OFFERED AT TRIAL, INCLUDING THAT
URGED AS CREDIBLE BY PLAINTIFF HIMSELF, AS APPLIED TO
UTAH LAW,
The trial court's decision to direct a verdict in defendant's
favor was appropriate and without error given the application of
Utah law to the evidence plaintiff himself presented to the court
and urged as dispositive.
A.
PLAINTIFF WAS DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE GIVEN THE EVIDENCE
PLAINTIFF HIMSELF PRESENTED AT TRIAL APPLIED TO THE
FACTORS CONSIDERED DISPOSITIVE BY THIS COURT.
Since the inception of this case and throughout trial below
plaintiff himself sought to convince the court that defendant was
responsible for permanent injuries he suffered as a result of an
accident that occurred while plaintiff was working for defendant
and mowing defendant's lawn.

As noted above, beginning with his

complaint plaintiff stressed the fact that he was working for
defendant at the time of the injury.
of

employment

became

more

And plaintiff's allegations

pronounced

before

trial,

although

defendant had raised in its answer the affirmative defense that the
provisions

of

Utah

Worker's

plaintiff's exclusive remedy.

Compensation

Act

constituted

(See R. at 22.)

Prior to trial plaintiff submitted numerous motions in limine,
several of which were supported by memoranda urging as follows:
11

[Plaintiff], a 7 year old minor child was a
volunteer worker at [defendant] when he was injured in
June 21, 1985. [Plaintiffs] father, Paul Gourdin, was
the theater maintenance manager and had been employed by
[defendant] for many years. fPlaintiff s father! had
responsibility for hiring volunteer and paid works Tsicl
and for the care and maintenance of the grounds. and was
supervising fplaintiff] the day of the accident.
Utah Code Annotated § 34-23-1 et seq. prohibits the
employment of children under the age of 14 in an
occupational setting in the use of power lawn equipment
•

. . •

(See R. 741-42 (emphasis added); accord R. 753-54; R. 737-38.) And
in a pretrial order submitted by plaintiff, he urged that he was a
volunteer worker for defendant when he was injured.

(See R. at

931.)
Plaintiff's argument and theory that he was working for
defendant at the time of his injury was further stressed at trial.
Beginning with his counsel's opening statement plaintiff stressed:
On the 21st day of June, 1985 [plaintiff's father], who
was in charge of the theater, in charge of taking care of
the grounds, mowing the grounds, had, as he had had
before, his sons with him. And the evidence will be that
his sons were volunteer workers, and that they had been
there before doing what they were that day, and on that
day they were mowing the lawn.
. . . and [plaintiff] was at [defendant] and as I have
told you he had been there many times before and he was
mowing the lawn.
(See R. 1091 at 76-77 (emphasis added).)
Plaintiff's father, an acknowledged employee of defendant,
then testified that plaintiff was working for defendant at the time
of the accident:
Q
A

[By plaintiff's counsel] Mr* Gourdin, I direct your
attention to June 21, 1985, and ask, were you employed by
[defendant] at that time?
Yes, I was.
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Q
A

Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

Would you tell the jury what your duties and
responsibilities at [defendant] were in June of 1985?
I was responsible for care and maintenance of the
building, cleaning the inside, outside, flowers, shrubs,
mowing the lawns; general upkeep of the building and
grounds.
For how long had you been charged with those duties and
responsibilities prior to June 21, 1985?
Three or four years.
Now, in June of 1985 did [defendant] have volunteer
forces?
Yes.
Now, were you authorized, in your capacity — well,
you've given us your duties and responsibilities. Tell
us your title?
Manager in charge of maintenance and grounds.
Now, in 1985 did [defendant] have volunteer workers
working for them?
Yes, they did.
Would you tell the jury, please, what a volunteer worker
is, as you understand it?
It's a person who would come into [defendant's] theater
and work one day or more a week for two or three, up to
four hours, and were not paid for their services.
Why?
Because it was, [defendant] is a community theater, and
many people that work there do so on a volunteer basis.
And the young people would give their time as service to
the community.
Were there volunteer workers there on June 21, 1985
working on the grounds or cutting the lawn around
[defendant]?
Yes.
And who were they?
[Plaintiff and his brother] were there working.
Now, who was operating power lawn mowers on that day?
Both [plaintiff and his brother].

. . . .

Q
A

All right. Mr. Gourdin, for whom was [plaintiff] working
on June 21, 1985?
For [defendant].

. . . .

Q
A
Q
A
•

Q

[By defendant's counsel] And would it be fair to say that
[plaintiff] was certainly not a regular person at mowing
the lawn at [defendant]?
Not perhaps every week but, yes, he did mow it.
Was he a regular there, Mr. Gourdin?
He usually came every day and worked for a couple of
hours, yes.
• . .

Well, let me ask you this. In 1985, besides [plaintiff]
and [his brother], did you have any other volunteers that
worked there for you?
13

A
.

Yes. As, I was trying to put the dates in from the time.
We had kids that would come in and clean after the summer
matinees. They were volunteer workers.
. . .

Q

And what was the youngest volunteer working that you ever
had working there at [defendant]?
Other than [plaintiff]?
Let's count [plaintiff].
[Plaintiff] would have been the youngest.

A
Q
A
•

• • .

Q
A
Q
A
Q

[By plaintiff's counsel] All right. A couple of points.
In 1985, in June, who had the authority to hire and use
volunteer workers at [defendant]?
I did.
You did have that authority?
Yes.
And you testified that you were controlling [plaintiff],
telling him what to do. And my question to you, Sir, is:
In what capacity were you operating in when you were
controlling rplaintiff'si activities, (a) your individual
capacity, or (b) your capacity as a manager of
fdefendant]?

. . . .

A

Basically as the manager of rdefendant!.

. . . .

Q
A
Q
A

Whose grass was cut that day, on the 21st day of June,
1985 [when plaintiff was injured]?
[Defendant's].
And for whose benefit was that, on 21 June, 1985 [when
plaintiff was injured]?
[Defendant's].

(R. 1092 at 301-02, 307, 317, 321, 323, 340-41, & 344 (emphasis
added).)

And in his deposition published at plaintiff's request

plaintiff's father also testified:
Q
A
Q

A

So [plaintiff] had worked as a volunteer employee the
summer before? This was his second summer?
Yes. When he really worked, I mean, they go with me
every place I go, but that is when they actually really
start to have them do work.
What I am wondering, though, Paul, is this a situation
where these kids are really volunteer workers, or is it
just like my 7-year-old son comes to work with me and
hangs around me for a couple of hours?
No, because if I did not have them do the work, I would
have to have somebody else come in and do the work. We
had to have so many boys come in each day and help us,
because that is how we kept down the pay help, was by
having the volunteer help come in. So if I did not have
them come, I had to have somebody else come in.
14

Q
A

Tell me what [plaintiff] had done?
What was
[plaintiff's] job.
The boys would pick papers up around the building. They
would carry candy inside, fix candy on the tables. They
helped mow the lawns.

at 637-38 (emphasis added).)
Thereafter, plaintiff himself testified:
Q

[By defendant's counsel] [Plaintiff] how old were you
when you first went to [defendant]?
A
When I was a baby.
Q
Did you always go there with your father?
A
Usually.
Q
Did you like to go to [defendant]?
A
Yes.
Q
Did you think it was fun to go to [defendant]?
A
Yes.
Q
What kind of things did you do when you were at
[defendant]?
A
Well, like pick up cups down the aisles, make paper
airplanes.
Q
Did you make paper airplanes the morning of the accident?
A
Can't remember.
Q
Did you swim in the pool at [defendant]?
A
Yes.
Q
Were you able to get in for free?
A
Yes.
Q
Did you go to movies there at [defendant]?
A
Yes.
Q
I guess you got into these free to one? [sic]
A
Yes.
1093 at 412-13.) And plaintiff later reemphasized his status
defendant's employee:
Q
[By defendant's counsel] [Plaintiff], what I would like
you to do, if you would be kind enough, is to read
portions of your deposition, starting on page 12, just a
few lines. I will read the question; if you would be
kind enough to read the answer.
Q
"Did you ever get any money for mowing the lawns?"
A
"Not from [defendant]. Sometimes from my dad, just when
he would just give me something."
Q
"Your dad would give you some money?"
A
"The witness is nodding his head in the affirmative."
1093 at 479.)

Plaintiff's own testimony that he was working

defendant at the time of the accident and was compensated
15

therefore

was

also

reiterated

through

plaintiff's

published

deposition statements:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

[By defense counsel] When you went to [defendant], were
you always with your father?
Yes.
When you went there to work?
Yes
Did you ever go there to work without your father?
When I was over at my Grandma's, I would.

(R. 616 (emphasis added).)
Thereafter, plaintiff presented the testimony of 13-year-old
Paul Carter who testified that, similar to plaintiff's situation,
(1) he worked as a volunteer for defendant cleaning the theaters
and mowing the lawns, (2) he had never filled out an application
and (3) he had received movie tickets as compensation.

(See R.

1093 at 405-07.)
And
president

finally, the court
that

defendant

heard testimony

had worker's

from defendant's

compensation

insurance

coverage at the time of the accident, that defendant considered its
volunteers staff members and that volunteers received compensation
for working at defendant's establishment in the form of free passes
to defendant's theater for the volunteer, his family, and a
personal friend, free passes to other movie theaters in Provo and
Orem, Utah for themselves and their friends, swimming privileges at
defendant's

swimming

pool, privileges

at

defendant's

outdoor

amphitheater, and discounts on all items purchased from defendant.
(See R. 1092 at 373; R. 1093 at 481-82, 496-99.) And in fact, said
compensation

was

a

part

of

defendant's

publication.

(See R. 1093 at 496.)
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personnel

handbook

After hearing all this evidence unequivocally demonstrating
that plaintiff was employed by defendant at the time his injuries
were sustained, the court ruled:
[Under] the facts presented, [plaintiff] was an
employee of [defendant] whether characterized as a
volunteer or otherwise as an employee, and that as such,
the remedies through which he is entitled to recover are
limited by the Workman's Compensation Statute.
The question of whether or not an employee
arrangement exists depends on several circumstances. The
allegations and the proof demonstrate that [plaintiff's
father] himself was an employee of [defendant] and that
he was acting as a maintenance manager for the theater
grounds.
On behalf of [defendant], he purported to
exercise control over the time, place and circumstances
of the worker's services that were performed by
[plaintiff]. [Plaintiff's father] purported to exercise
the right to hire and fire employees and volunteers.
Equipment was furnished by [defendant] and supervision
over the use of the equipment was provided by
[plaintiff's father].
The evidence is without dispute that there was some
remuneration or compensation given to [plaintiff] as a
consequence of his relationship with [defendant]. It
appears to the court that [plaintiff's] right in his own
capacity to exercise privileges afforded to volunteer
workers at [defendant] was sufficient to constitute
compensation under the Workman's Compensation Act.
(R. at 1077-78.)
plaintiff's

The court concluded as such notwithstanding

argument

employee bee a

•

that plaintiff

could

not

•

be defendant's
;ec:i to accept,,

compensation available to him since he already obtained benefits
through his father's employment with defendant.
44-505; R

(See R. 1093 at

3 093 at 433-455 ) In directing its verdict, the court

correctly distinguished the very cases plaintiff now cites on
appeal, ruling that plaintiff received coiripensai I on in l\h*j fnrni af
free tickets and other items, was supervised by defendant's manager
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and was not working for his own individual purposes.
at 443-45, 455.)

(See R. 1093

In short, the court concluded:

That [plaintiff's father] himself was a manager of
the grounds that on behalf of, purported to exercise
control over the time, place and circumstances of the
work or services that were performed by [plaintiff]; that
[plaintiff's father] purported to exercise the right to
hire and fire employees or volunteers; that equipment was
furnished by [defendant] and was supervised in the use
thereof determined by [plaintiff's father].
And the evidence is without dispute that there was
some remuneration or compensation given to [plaintiff] as
a consequence of his relationship with defendant.
Whether or not he exercised that right, it appears that
he did not, that he had the same advantages he would
otherwise have had by reason of his father's employment.
. . . .

Ordinarily, the question of these matters may be a
question of fact, a mixed question of fact and law. But
where they are unrefuted and undisputed as to these
items, it appears to the court that it does become a
matter and a question of law for the court to decide.
« . . .

I'm concerned about this case, I fretted about it,
worried about it, and realize that the consequences of
the court taking it away from the jury is a serious
thing. But I do believe that under the circumstances and
the proof that is before this court, that the court has
no alternative.
(R. 1093 at 504-508.)

The trial Judge's ruling was correct as a

matter of law.
In evaluating whether plaintiff was an employee of defendant
at the time of the accident, this Court should first look to the
pertinent
scheme.

provisions of Utah worker's compensations

statutory

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1985) defined employers

thusly:
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation,
including every public utility, having in service one or
more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment, under
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written
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The term "regularly" as herein used shall include
all employments in the usual course of the trade,
business, profession, or occupation of the employerf
whether continuous throughout the year or for only a
portion of the year.
SI mi larly

Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-1-41 (Siipp. 1985) defined an

employee as:
(b) every person in the service of any
employer, as defined in Subsection 35-1-42(2), who
employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in
the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract or hire, express or implied, oral or
written, including aliens, and minors whether legally or
illegally working for hire, but not including any person
whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of
trade, business, or occupation of his employer.
These statutes form the basis in this action for determining
whether

the

-;

:•" •• «

Compensation Act apply
§ 35-1-60.

-irieciy provi sloes

of

Utah's

Worker's

k

o plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Based upon the above statutes an employer is one who

regularly employs workers under an express or implied and oral, or
written contract.

And an employee is likewise any person in the

service of one who

re g U i ar iy

employs others under express or

implied and oral or written contracts.
This Court has repeatedly considered the issue of when an
individual i s an employee under Utah Worker s Compensation Act in
its various amended forms. Most recently, in Board of Education of
Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984), this
Court heard an appeal from an administi ative ] aw judge's award of
worker's compensation benefits to an individual the administrative
law judge had found

"volunteer" of the school district. In

that case, before analyzing the plaintiff's relationship with the
employer this Court initially noted that as a volunteer the
19

plaintiff was not eligible for worker's compensation under Utah
law.1

See id. at 51.

Thereafter the Court articulated several

factors controlling whether an employment relationship existed:
An employee is hired and paid a salary or wage,
works under the direction of the employer, and is subject
to the employer's control.
We have also considered the intent of the parties,
and the business of the employer.
In the present case, [plaintiff] received no
compensation for helping in shop classes. He was brought
in as a RSVP volunteer.
The lunch tickets were not
provided by the [defendant] school district, but by RSVP.
The [defendant] school district had no control over his
hours or any other aspect of his volunteer work. There
is no evidence that he or the school district intended to
establish an employment relationship, even an informal
one.
[Plaintiff] operated his own residential
construction business, and from the record it appears
that most of the carpentry work he performed as a
"volunteer" was in fact for his business. At the time of
the injury, he was working on a personal project.
Id. at 52 (citation omitted).
In

addition

to

concluding

that

the

employee/employer

relationship turns upon an analysis of (1) whether the individual
is hired and paid a salary or wage; (2) whether the individual
works

under the direction

of the employer;

(3) whether the

importantly, for purposes of this Court's review of the
instant case, the fact that plaintiff's status was termed a
"volunteer worker" and the fact that defendant has acknowledged
that volunteers work for defendant is neither particularly
relevant nor outcome determinative. The term "volunteer" in this
case only served to distinguish defendant's employees that
received monetary wages from those that received other forms of
compensation.
And, as noted above, even defendant's president
acknowledged that volunteer workers were considered staff
employees of defendant.
Thus, as in Olsen, the real issue in
this case is not whether the plaintiff had the title "volunteer
worker," but whether, as the trial court concluded, plaintiff was
defendant's employee.

20

individual is subject to the employers control; (4) the intent of
the parties; and (5) the business of the employer, this Court has
also

enumerated

several

other

factors

to

be

considered

in

establishing whether such an employment relationship exists. These
factors include analyzing (6) whether viewing the individual as an
employee

would

compensation

be

contrary

statute,

see

to
id.

the purpose
at

52;

(7)

of
the

the

worker's

covenants or

agreements existing concerning the right of direction and control
over the employee whether express or implied, Glen M. Barney & Sons
v, Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1980); (8) the
employer's right to hire or fire the individual, see id.; (9) the
method of pay ment i nvol ved, see id. ; (1 0) who furn i shes the
equipment, see id.: (11) whether the claimed employee is regularly
"working" as required by the Worker's Compensation Act or is merely
a casual employee, Palle v. Industrial Commission, 7 P. 2d 2 84, 2 90
(Utah 1932); Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 196 P.2d 718,
720-21 (Utah 1948); and (12) whether the employee is in the service
of an employer.

See Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 72 6 P. 2d

427, 429 (Utah 1986).
While the elements of control by the employer and
the intent of the parties are the most important
fcriteria1, none of the fabove-listed1 factors separately
is controlling. It is from consideration of all of them
together that determination is to be made whether the
relationship
is
in
essence
of
that
of
an
employer/employee or independent contractor.
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228-29 (Utah
1977) (emphasis added) (citing Sutton v. Industrial Commission, 9
Utah 2d 339, 344 P.2d 538, 540 (1959)). And certainly this Court's
analysis must take into account the purposes of Utah's Worker's
21

Compensation Act which must be liberally construed and should be
viewed as "broad enough to cover all employment relationships,"
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885, 888 (Utah
1945), since "the provisions are intended to expand liability to
those who may not qualify as a common law employee."

Pinter

Construction Company v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah 1984).
Consideration of each of the factors enumerated by this Court
establishes the appropriateness of the court7s directed verdict
below.
1^
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED COMPENSATION
FOR WORKING FOR DEFENDANT.
As noted above, this Court has previously ruled that one of
the factors to consider in determining whether an employee/employer
relationship exists is whether "[a]n employee is hired and paid a
salary or wage."

Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52.

While the worker's

compensation statutes do not provide a definition for wage, this
Court in another context has previously cited with approval the
definition

of

"wages" used

in

the

"Model

Compensation

and

Rehabilitation Law (Revised)," published by the Council of State
Governments:
"Wages" means in addition to money payments for
services rendered, the reasonable value of board, rent,
housing, lodging, fuel or similar advantage received from
the employer, and gratuities received in the course of
employment from others than the employer."
Blake Stevens Construction v. Henion, 697 P.2d 230, 231 (Utah 1985)
(emphasis added). This Court also has recognized that "most courts
that have considered the question have included as part of an
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employee's wages, living quarters and food which are provided to an
employee,"

including

such

utilities.

Id. at 231-32.

things

as

meals,

taxi

farer

and

This acknowledgment comports with this

Coin: t s implici t ho] di ng :i i 1 Olsen, supra wherein it ruled that the
plaintiff therein was not an employee of the Board of Education
considering the fact, among others, that the Board itself had not
provided the plaintiff lunch as compensation for his work, at, I, he
school.

See Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52. In holding as such, this Court

emphasized that had the plaintiff in Olsen been awarded lunch or
other compensation for his work or services, at least one factor in
the employment relationship analysis would have been met.
The fact that compensation awarded an entpl oyee can be other
than money was recognized in cases previously cited by this Court.
See, e.g.. Henion, 697 P.2d at 231-32.

Yet plaintiff would have

this Court believe that he received no compensation for working for
defendant other than an occasional theater pass.

However, under

this Court's previous ruling :ii n Olsen and genera] principles of
worker's compensation law the requirements of "salary" or "wage"
are met in even a pure definitional sense by the receipt of such
"compensation, " "recompense" m

"ret,urn, " Fin ther ,. the trial court

had before it unrefuted evidence that plaintiff was afforded not
only

theater passes

for himself, his family

and

friends, but

likewise was able to receive free admission to swimming facilities
and discounts on items purchased from defendant

As the trial

court noted, free theater passes resulted in significant savings tc>
plaintiff

and thus equated

compensation scheme.

to compensation under the worker's

(See R. 1093 at 443.)
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And, even though it

may be argued that plaintiff was otherwise entitled to similar
benefits through his father's employment with defendant, whether or
not an employee takes advantage or uses said compensation is not
relevant for determining that employee's status.

The critical

question is whether compensation is afforded the employee as it was
to plaintiff in this case.
Moreover, in urging this Court to conclude that he did not
receive compensation plaintiff selectively ignores that he admitted
to

having

received

money

defendant's establishment.

from

his

father

after

working

at

The evidence presented to the trial

court as to the receipt of these monies certainly demonstrates that
in addition

to the other recompense

or return

noted above,

plaintiff received substance for his work as defendant's employee.
As this Court has recognized, under the Model Compensation Act,
such "gratuities received in the course of employment from others
than the employer" certainly constitute wages; Henion, 697 P.2d at
231, and any argument to the contrary is without support in the
record and violates common sense.
In sum, unlike the plaintiff in Olsen, supra, plaintiff in
this case was afforded the equivalent of his "lunch ticket," namely
his

theate»r,

defendant.

swimming

and

discount

tickets,

directly

from

See Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52.
2±

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
PLAINTIFF WORKED UNDER DEFENDANT'S DIRECTION
As noted in this Court's decision in Olsen, another factor in
determining whether an employment relationship exists is whether an
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employee "works under the direction of the employer."

See Olsen,

684 P.2d at 52. This principle was stated by this Court at least
as early as 192 0,
603, 188

See Strieker v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah

, B4'":)'„ H'VI (1920), In Olsen there was no indi cati on that

that plaintiff worked under the direction of his claimed employer,
the school district.

In contrast, in this case the record is

replete with uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff worked under
the direct supervision of his father, who held the responsibility
as

a manager

c >f defendant's

maintenance workers,

grounds

tc > h i re and

supervise

Further, plaintiff testified that he would

take instructions from his father as to work that needed to be
performed and h :i s father would supervise his efforts. (See R. i Jti,742, 754, 1092 at 340-44.) There can be no dispute that this prong
of the employment analysis has been met.2
2s.
ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BELOW CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS SUBJECT TO
DEFENDANTS CONTROL.
This Court has also listed the "subject to the employer's
control" factor as pertinent in establishing whether an employment
relationship exists. See Olsen, CiB4 P , ?d at S2 ,

As this Com t has

repeatedly noted, "it is not the actual exercise of control that
determines whether an employer/employee relationship exists" or the
"degree of control"

which is essential but the "right to control

2

While plaintiff also incorrectly argued below that his
status as a minor precluded the court from ruling that he was an
employee, this argument is entirely without merit under the
applicable statute and this Court's previous rulings.
See
Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985)
overruling in part Ortega, 156 P.2d 885,
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that is determinative."

Frisby, 678 P.2d

at 309

(citations

omitted); Bambrouah v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1291 (Utah 1976)
(footnote omitted); Sommerville, 196 P.2d at 720.

In Bennett v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1986), this
Court held:
many factors have been applied in determining the right
to control. Among those factors are actual supervision
of the worker, the extent of the supervision, the method
of payment, the furnishing of equipment for the worker,
and the right to terminate the worker. These factors are
to be applied in favor of the employee relationship.
In 01sen, this Court ruled that "the school district had no
control over

[plaintiff's] hours or any other aspect of his

volunteer work."

See 684 P.2d at 52.

In Sommerville, this Court

likewise found no evidence that the employer had any right to
control the work of the plaintiff since the claimed employer had
"merely showed" the plaintiff what work was to be performed.
196 P.2d at 720.

See

In contrast, in Frisby, the employer had the

right to control the employee since he maintained some control over
the materials used on the job and was a "job superintendent."
678 P.2d at 309.

See

And in Bambrough, the right to control was

evidenced by the fact that the employer directed the employee's
efforts.

See 552 P.2d at 1289-92.

In contrast to this Court's opinion in Olsen and in similarity
to the decisions in Frisby and Bambrough, the plaintiff herein was
subject to defendant's control in all respects.

Here plaintiff's

father, defendant's maintenance manager, supervised plaintiff by
plaintiff's

own

admissions,

provided

directed all of plaintiff's efforts.
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the

materials

used

and

Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309;

Bennett, 726 P.2d at 430.
plaintiff
control

was

subject

defendant

in

As a maintenance worker for defendant,

to defendant's

control, which

fact repeatedly

exercised

in

right

of

instructing

plaintiff, through defendant's supervisor, as to duties that needed
to be performed and the manner of accomplishing the same.

(See R.

at 635, 634, 622, R. 1092 at 317.1

Plaintiff herein was not

performing work for his own business,

was the case in Olsen, C>84

P.2d at 52, and there is clearly no allegation that plaintiff was
working at hi s c wi I personal project.
In short, as with the other employment factors noted above,
there is no evidence to support any conclusion other than that
plaintiff

wa.1-.

subject

to

detendant':*'

••• >nt ro I

s'n

h i ,s wui 1. ,

establishing the employment relationship in that respect.
4,
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATES THAT AN EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP EXISTED.
The

intent

of

the

parties

is

a

further

element

to

be

considered in determining whether an employee/employer relationship
exists.

See Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52.

In analyzing this factor,

plaintiff's consent to ac t as an employee is certain] y relevant
In Bambrouah, this Court previously held:
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act does not expressly
require consent on the employee's part to establish the
requisite relationship, nor is a written contract a
required formality for workmen's compensation for
purposes under the laws of Utah.
,
Under Utah law
consent to the relationship may be implied by the conduct
of the parties.
See 552 P.2d at 1291-92 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

Given

the facts presented below, the trial court had no choice but to
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conclude that

the parties

intended that

an

employer/employee

relationship exist since both parties consented to the same through
their conduct.

In contrast to the plaintiff in Olsen, supra,

plaintiff herein was solely working and benefitting

defendant in

mowing defendant's lawns and doing other necessary work. Further,
plaintiff was paid for such services and was entitled to receive
additional compensation therefor.
express

and

intentional

These facts, together with the

supervisory

conduct

on

the

part

of

defendant's manager, plaintiff's father, demonstrates that both
parties intended that an employment relationship exist.

THE FACT THAT THE SERVICES PLAINTIFF RENDERED
WERE NECESSARY FOR DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS
ESTABLISHES THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP.
As this Court has likewise noted, an additional factor to
consider in addressing the instant issue is whether the employee
rendered services "necessary to or in furtherance of his employer's
usual trade, business, or occupation."

See Sorenson v. Industrial

Commission, 598 P.2d 362, 363 (Utah 1979) (citing Sommerville, 113
Utah 504, 509, 596 P.2d 718, 721).
brief

plaintiff

was

As conceded in plaintiff's

injured while performing work which was

regularly performed by defendant's employees. Unlike the facts in
Olsen, where that plaintiff was basically working for himself on
school district premises, here plaintiff was working for defendant
to maintain grounds which were the very subject of defendant's
trade and business.
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1L-L
THE IMPLICIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
ESTABLISHES THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP.
As noted in Glen M. Barney & Sons, another

factor which bear s

on the employment relationship is "whatever covenants or agreements
exist

< oncerninq

the

riqht. ol

direction

employee, whether express or implied."
previously,

Utah's

Worker's

and

control

609 P.2d at 949.

Compensation

Act

does

over

the

As stated

not

require

consent on the employee's part to establish the relationship, just
as it does not require a written contract.
1291,
[the

Bambrouah, 552 P.2d at

Instead, "it is sufficient 'if at the time of the accident,
employee]

was

engaged

in

[defendant's]

same

employment.'

Under Utah law consent to the relationship may be implied by the
conduct

of

the

pan ties. "

Id.

at

J 291 -92

(citi ng

Peterson

v.

Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972)).
Here,
employment
subjecting

plaintiff
at

the

himself

was

time

of

certainly
hi s

on repeated

engaged

accident

occasions

in

and

hI s

to the

defendant's maintenance manager indicates as much.

defendant's
conduct

supervision

in
of

Even plaintiff

admits in his brief on appeal that he was under the direction and
supervision

of defendant's maintenance manager

(see

plaintiff's

brief at 14) and that p] a i nti ff was "consi dered an employee."

(See

plaintiff's

the

brief at

18.)

A clear and complete reading of

record belies plaintiff's claim that there was no implied contract
and utterly refutes plaintiff's erroneous allegations or inferences
that

(1) defendant chose not to submit an injury report to the

Industrial Commission

(see plaintiff's brief at 6 ) ; (2) pi a intiff
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did not receive valuable compensation for his work (see plaintiff's
brief at 8); (3) plaintiff never received monetary compensation for
his work (see plaintiff's brief at 18); and (4) the lack of a
contract of hire is enough to bar a conclusion that plaintiff was
an employee.

(See plaintiff's brief at 20.)

As plaintiff

expressly admits in his brief, plaintiff "was acting under the
direction and control of [defendant] when he was injured, and so
was not a trespasser, licensee or invitee." (See plaintiff's brief
at 8 (emphasis added).)

Incongruously, plaintiff on one hand

wishes this Court to accept that plaintiff was under the direction
and control of defendant when he was injured so that this Court
will not otherwise view plaintiff as a trespasser, yet on the other
hand attempts to deny that an employment relationship existed.
7^
DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE PLAINTIFF.
There is no question that defendant had the right to hire or
fire plaintiff and plaintiff has not disputed such fact.
!LL

DEFENDANT'S METHOD OF PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF WAS SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP.
As this Court stated in Glen M. Barney & Sons, "the method of
payment, i.e. whether in wages or fees, as compared to payment for
a complete job or project" is a factor to consider in determining
whether an employee/employer relationship exists. See 609 P.2d at
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949. Here, notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments to the contrary,
plaintiff received valuable compensation for his work.3
9^
DEFENDANT FURNISHED PLAINTIFF'S EQUIPMENT.
Whether the employer furnished the employee's equipment is a
further factor to consider in determining the existence of an
employment relationship.
949.

See Glen M. Barney & Sons. bOy P 2d at

As this Court has acknowledged, "the furnishing of valuable

equipment to a worker Indicates an employer/employee relationship."
(See Bennett, 726 P.2d at 430.)

Certainly in this instance

defendant furnished plaintiff valuable lawn equipment to perform
the services r endered.

Such fdcl;i alsu support the determination

that plaintiff was defendant's employee.
10.
PLAINTIFF WAS MORE THAN A CASUAL 'WORKER
IN DEFENDANT'S REGULAR WORK.
As noted above, another factor pertinent z

employment

relationship is whether the employer regularly employed others for
at least a por ti on of 1:1 le year in the same services as those the
employee performed, and whether the employee's work was casual as
that term is defined in context with the act.

3

See Utah Code Ann.

The fact that benefits were available to plaintiff through
his father's employment with defendant is also irrelevant since
plaintiff could receive his own benefits such benefits were
apparently different from those that plaintiff's father received.
By his own account plaintiff would also be allowed to receive
free movie tickets for his friends, which "companion" tickets for
both plaintiff and plaintiff's friends were evidently not
otherwise available through his father's employment.
(See
plaintiff's brief at 14 (plaintiff's father evidently entitled to
tickets for family or friends).)
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§§ 35-1-42f -43. Contrary to plaintiff's argument in his brief, in
order to be defendant's employee plaintiff need not have been
regularly employed by defendant, but insteadf need only have been
more than casually employed by defendant who regularly employed for
the same work plaintiff performed.
Applying

this test, there

is no dispute

that

defendant

regularly esmployed plaintiff and others for lawn and facilities
maintenance.

Further, as this Court has previously stated, the

test "as to whether an employee is a casual employee is whether the
services rendered by him are necessary to, or in furtherance of his
employer's usual trade, business, or occupation." Sommerville, 196
P.2d at 721.

And this Court has ruled that casual or occasional

employment in the usual course of the employer's trade or business
does

not preclude

the employee

relationship

since the terms

"regularly employed" and "casual" as utilized in Utah's worker's
compensation statute "was intended to include all employments,
regular, casual, or occasional, in the usual trade or business of
the employer."

In other words, the term "regularly employed" as it

is used in the applicable statute
is to be determined by the character of the work in which
[the individual is] employed, however brief or long, and
not by the character of the employment, whether regular,
casual, occasional, periodical, or otherwise, so long as
fthe individual was] hired and engaged to do work in the
common or usual business of the employer.
See Palle, 7 P.2d at 290 (emphasis added).

Given this Court's

rulings there is no question that plaintiff meets the status of
defendant's employee based upon his more than casual work for
defendant who regularly employed individuals to perform the exact
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services plaintiff rendered. And, even under plaintiff's erroneous
view of "regular employment" argued in his brief the testimony of
defendant's

manager,

plaintiff's

father,

fully

supports

the

conclusion thai plaintiff worked for defendant on a daily basis and
not just sporadically as plaintiff would have this Court now
believe.
11,
THE CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE
IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE
PURPOSE OF UTAH'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTE.
As a final factor in determining whether plaintiff was an
employee of defendant, this Court should look
Utah,""" s worker s compensation scheme•

See

Asen,

^

purpose of
P. 2d 52 •

Having repeatedly considered the Worker's Compensation Act over the
years this Court is intensely aware of the Act's underpinnings and
the principles involved that favor defining injured workers as
employees covered by the terms of Utah's worker's compensation
scheme, Although not comprehensively stated, these pri nci p] es were
recognized in Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, when this
Court reiterated Professor Larsen's views that the remedial purpose
of the Worker's Compensate on Act:
is to spread the burden of industrial accidents across
the population.
Therefore, Larsen suggests, more
emphasis should be placed on the nature of the work
performed. If a worker is integrally or continuously
involved in an employer's business, and the worker's own
operations are not such that they could readily channel
the cost of an industrial accident to the general
population, the worker should be considered an employee
for workmen's compensation purposes.
See 726 P.2d at 430 n.2 (citations omitted).

Here, plaintiff was

integrally and quite continuously involved in defendant's business
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in a manner where the cost of his accident cannot be readily
channeled to the general populace* Affirming plaintiff's status as
an

employee

does

not

violate

the

purposes

of

the

Worker's

Compensation Act, but rather furthers the same since it guarantees
a remedy, if all other statutory pre-requisites are met, and
assists in reducing litigation and meeting those public policy
concerns upon which Utah's Worker's Compensation Act is based.
Certainly an individual who meets the criteria that plaintiff has
in this case for establishing his employee status should not be
allowed to circumvent Utah's worker's compensation scheme when
(1) plaintiff was paid remuneration, (2) plaintiff worked under
defendant's direction, (3) plaintiff was subject to defendant's
control, (4) the parties implicitly intended that an employment
relationship exist, (5) plaintiff furthered defendant's business,
(6) there was implicit agreement and consent by plaintiff to act as
defendant's employee, (7) defendant had the right to hire and fire
plaintiff, (8) defendant furnished plaintiff equipment and (9)
defendant did not perform his employment services casually.

This

is not a situation, as plaintiff claims for the first time on
appeal, of public policy being violated if plaintiff is limited to
the provisions of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act.

Instead,

public policy mandates the trial court's conclusion in this case.
Based upon all the factors enumerated by this Court and the
legislature, plaintiff fits the status of defendant's employee, and
the trial court correctly directed a verdict in defendant's favor
in this respect.
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II.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF "VOLUNTEER" STATUS
ARE MISLEADING AND WITHOUT MERIT.
As noted above, the fact that plaintiff has emphasized his
"volunteer worker" title is misleading and not determinative for
purposes of the above evaluation under this Court's previous
articulation of those factors governing employment relationships.
There is no question that defendant's volunteer workers were
treated as staff members and received benefits and regularly
performed

obligations

supervision.

under

defendant's

direct

control

and

Further, even assuming that the "volunteer worker"

title is somehow pertinent in this instance, other than being
titled a "volunteer worker" there is no indication that plaintiff
actually met the definition of a "volunteer" as recognized by wellestablished law.
Because determinations of "volunteer" status are closely tied
to the facts of each case, sufficient reason exists not rely upon
the "volunteer worker" issue as a basis for evaluating the trial
court's decision below.

Nevertheless, in addition to cases cited

by plaintiff in his brief, all of which are either distinguishable
or not controlling given the jurisdictions presented, this Court
has already indicated that an employee status has existed in such
cases where only meals, taxi fare, utilities, housing and milk were
provided in exchange for services rendered.

See Blake Stevens

Construction, 697 P.2d at 231-32. Numerous other courts have also
concluded

that

an

employment

relationship

analogous to that presently before the court.
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existed

in

cases

In Flamingo Motor

Inn v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 200, 650 P.2d
502 (Ct. App. 1982), that court, in applying a statutory workmen's
compensation scheme that this Court has already decided "is almost
identical to Utah's," see Pinter Construction, 678 P.2d at 309,
ruled that an individual who assisted a restaurant owner with the
moving and installation of kitchen equipment in exchange for a
round of drinks was an employee of the restaurant owner within that
state's Worker's Compensation Act.

See Flamingo Motor Inn, 650

P.2d at 503-05. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Johnson
v. Industrial Commission, 88 Arizona 354, 356 P.2d 1021 (1960)
ruled that an incarcerated individual who was provided food,
lodging, sundries, and cigarettes in exchange for work, was an
employee of the establishment he assisted notwithstanding the fact
that as a result of his work he received other compensation from
another source in the form of reduction of his prison sentence.
And

the

courts

of

Oregon

have

similarly

concluded

that

an

individual who received free boarding in exchange for services was
an employee under that state's statutory scheme, see Scott v. State
Accident Insurance Fund, 42 Or. App. 595, 600 P.2d 967 (1979); and
teenage girls who received lunches, free use of riding horses and
an occasional payment of a couple of dollars in exchange for
performing chores at the riding academy were employees for purposes
of that state's Worker's Compensation Act.

Buckner v. Kennedy's

Riding Academy, 526 P.2d 450 (Or. App. 1974).
Accordingly, based upon the cases noted, and upon this Court's
established analysis, it is clear that the trial court correctly
ruled

herein

that

an

employment
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relationship

existed

and

plaintiff's remedies were therefore limited by the provisions of
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act.
III.
ASSUMING THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING
A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS.
Based upon evidence presented

at trial below the court

correctly directed a verdict in defendant's favor on the basis that
plaintiff was defendant's employee.

Nevertheless, even if the

court erred in directing its verdict, such error was harmless since
(1) absent the error there is no reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the plaintiff; (2) if plaintiff was not deemed
defendant's employee, he was a trespasser and defendant breached no
applicable duty owed; and (3) plaintiff failed to raise below the
arguments he now asserts on appeal.
A.
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT IF PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE PLAINTIFF WAS A TRESPASSER TO
WHOM NO APPLICABLE DUTY WAS BREACHED.
As noted in Point I above, plaintiff attempted since the
initiation of this lawsuit to present evidence that he was working
for defendant at the time of the injury and thus should be entitled
to compensation therefore. Only when defendant argued the defense
that plaintiff's claims were limited by Utah worker's compensation
scheme did plaintiff "back pedal" from his sole theory of recovery.
By that time, the majority of evidence presented unequivocally
supported

the

trial

court's

conclusion

that

defendant's employee at the time of his injury.

plaintiff

was

In fact, the only

significant evidence not supportive of this conclusion demonstrates
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that if plaintiff was not defendant's employee at the time of his
injury he was a trespasser to defendant and was not injured by
defendant's breach of any duty owed a trespasser.4
Although plaintiff expressly acknowledges in his brief that he
"was acting under the direction and control of [defendant] when he
was injured" (see plaintiff's brief at 8) at the same time he
wishes this Court to acknowledge that he was not a trespasser,
licensee, invitee or employee of defendant, but rather fell within
an invented "gratuitous servant" category not recognized under Utah
law.

While this novel argument was not raised below and should

thus not be considered now on appeal (see Point III B, infra), the
evidence presented clearly demonstrates that if plaintiff was not
defendant's employee at the time of his injury he was a trespasser
to defendant and was owed no duty by defendant except to avoid
willfully and intentionally injuring plaintiff. As this Court has
repeatedly held, "a property owner's duty to a person injured on
his property is determined by that person's status on that property
as a "invitee," a "licensee," or a "trespasser.""
Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Company. 813 P.2d

1169

Pratt v.
(Utah 1991)

(citing Tias v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979); Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 329-43 (1967)).

And a "land owner owes no

duty to a trespasser, except to refrain from causing willful and
wanton injury to him or her." Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d

4

Facts supporting plaintiff's trespasser status include the
testimony that he never filled out an application, he operated
power equipment in violation of defendant's policy and he was not
considered a staff member by defendant's president. (R. 1092 at
368-74.)
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1360 (Utah 1986).

This Court has also ruled that those entering

upon the land of another with what is believed to be an implied
invitation to visit the premises or for the mutual advantage of the
property owner do not necessarily hold the status of "invitees" but
may be trespassers under the law.

See, e.g., Jones v. Horman's

Inc., 15 Utah 2d 188, 389 P.2d 738 (1964).

In that case, the

plaintiff's husband had been told that he might be offered work by
the defendant at some time in the future.

The plaintiff was

injured while accompanying her husband to the defendant's premises
to view the work site; and she claimed that she held the status of
an invitee by reason of an implied invitation she believed her
husband had received to visit the defendant's premises.

This

Court, however, denied that argument outright and ruled that both
plaintiff and her husband were trespassers under the circumstances
given the lack of an invitation and the unreasonable hour. See 398
P.2d at 739.
Similarly, other courts have ruled that "to one who is a
volunteer, . . . even if assisting in the master's work at the
request of a servant, no affirmative duty to exercise care is due
originally, but only after knowledge of peril." Bogart v. Hester,
347 P.2d 327, 331 (N.M. 1959) (citation omitted).

In Bogart, the

plaintiff was visiting his uncle's place of employment to borrow a
tool and was injured when he volunteered to assist his uncle in
loading

a tank.

That court

held that

summary

judgment was

appropriately granted the defendant even if the plaintiff was not
considered a trespasser since his status as a "volunteer" did not
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entitle him to recover from the defendant employer because as noted
elsewhere:
[t]he defendant had no knowledge of the situation which
arose, and could not well have anticipated what happened.
The servant, by invitation or by acceptance of volunteer
assistance, could impose no new or greater obligation on
the master than that which the master owed to him. Nor
could the invitee or volunteer create a new or greater
liability by his act.
The authorities sustain the
principle of non-liability under such circumstances.
See id. at 329-30 (citation omitted). In ruling as such, the court
cited numerous opinions from other jurisdictions referencing that
when plaintiffs volunteer to assist employers at the request of one
of the employer's employees, the only obligation resting upon the
employer is to refrain from any wanton or willful act producing
injury.

See id. at 330-32.

This Court should utilize this

standard here.
Given plaintiffs own claims in this case that he was working
for defendant he must be presumed to have either been an employee
or a trespasser of defendant.

If he was an employee of defendant

his remedies are limited by Utah worker's compensation law. On the
other hand, if plaintiff was a trespasser to defendant, defendant
owed no duty other than to avoid willfully and wantonly injuring
plaintiff. And since there is no evidence that defendant willfully
or wantonly injured plaintiff, any error in directing a verdict in
defendant's

favor

on

the

employment

issue

was

harmless.

Accordingly, the trial court's verdict below should be sustained on
appeal.
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B.
SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE BELOW HIS
"GRATUITOUS SERVANT" AND PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTSf
SUCH ARGUMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.
This Court has long upheld the rule that it will generally
refuse to consider issues not presented to the trial court below.
See Zions First National Bank v. National American Title Insurance,
749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited therein).

In that

case, the appellant had argued that there was no "sound policy
reason" for this Court not considering the issue first raised on
appeal since the issue was arguably a legal question.

However,

this Court ruled:
[Appellant's] position ignores one of the reasons
for refusing to consider any matter for the first time on
appeal, even a matter of law. Although we may not defer
to a trial court's conclusions on a legal question, we
certainly may derive great benefit from the trial judge's
views on the issue and may be persuaded by those views.
This provides ample justification for refusing to
consider [appellant's] claim.
Id. at 654. And this Court also noted that the issue in any event
involved

"a question of fact which may not be determined on

appeal."

Id.

Further, in Allisen v. American Legion Post 134, 763 P.2d 806
(Utah

1988) this Court

likewise concluded that it would not

consider a theory of recovery raised on appeal where a different
theory was alleged under the complaint and the trial court had
limited

its ruling

complaint.

to the theory

See id. at 807-809.

raised

in the

plaintiff's

Applying these rules of law and

sound legal reasoning to the facts of this case demonstrates the
soundness of this Court not considering plaintiff's arguments
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raised

for the

first

time on appeal concerning

his desired

"gratuitous servant" status and claimed public policy violations of
Utah's worker's compensation scheme.
As noted above and as referenced by a plain reading of the
record below, since the filing of this complaint, plaintiff's sole
theory of recovery was based upon the argument that he was injured
while acting as a volunteer worker for defendant. Notwithstanding
the fact that defendant asserted in its answer that plaintiff's
claims were limited by application of Utah's Worker's Compensation
Act, plaintiff did not address this possibility and never argued or
pursued

other

theories

of recovery

below.

It wasn't

until

defendant made its arguments for a directed verdict on the ground
that plaintiff's claims were limited by the Worker's Compensation
Act that plaintiff began to "back pedal" away from his employee
theory and urge the court to not adopt such a view.

Yet, even as

part of plaintiff's argument below, plaintiff never raised his
"gratuitous servant" argument invented for appeal as a basis for
this Court to conclude that the Worker's Compensation Act did not
apply to him.

Further, plaintiff did not argue below the public

policy claims he now urges on appeal (see plaintiff's brief at 37).
Certainly, this Court would have been aided by the trial
court's decision below regarding plaintiff's novel and unrecognized
allegations that plaintiff

should be viewed as a "gratuitous

servant" under the arguments set forth for the first time in
plaintiff's appellate brief.

(See plaintiff's brief at pp. 20-28;

Zions, 749 P.2d

Further, the issue as to whether

at 654.)

plaintiff could be a "gratuitous servant," assuming this invented
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status was recognized in Utah, is a factual question; and the trial
court should have been afforded an opportunity to consider the same
if plaintiff wanted to raise and pursue this claim on appeal.
Likewise, this Court would have been well served by arguments,
analyses, evidence and conclusions presented to or made by the
trial court involving plaintiff's novel argument that "public
policy

intentionally

coverage."

precludes

volunteers

from

worker's

act

(See plaintiff's brief at 29-38.)

In short, plaintiff should not be benefitted by his failure to
raise arguments below which he now wishes to address on appeal. A
plain reading of the complaint will demonstrate that such claims
have not been properly raised or significantly argued below to
obtain the trial court's consideration thereof prior to this
Court's review on appeal.5
IV.
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S NOVEL ARGUMENTS ARE CONSIDERED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN DIRECTING ITS VERDICT.
Notwithstanding the fact that this Court should not review
plaintiff's "gratuitous servant" and public policy arguments raised
for the first time on appeal, even if the Court chooses to do so,

5

Although this Court should not review defendant's public
policy allegations raised for the first time on appeal, such
allegations nevertheless lack foundation since plaintiff elicited
no evidence from the Industrial Commission or others that the
trial court's decision regarding plaintiff's employee status
would have a "profound effect" on charitable organizations in the
state of Utah, as he now claims in his brief. And plaintiff's
plea for the court to take "judicial notice" of such facts was
not previously raised.
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it should conclude that the trial court did not err in directing a
verdict in this case based upon correct applications of law.
Plaintiff's invented "gratuitous servant" theory of recovery
is not recognized by Utah's Worker's Compensation Act.

And this

Court has previously expressed its refusal to judicially expand
Utah's worker's compensation

statutes.

Indeed,

in Board of

Education of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, this
Court considered the argument that the administrative law judge had
incorrectly

concluded

that

provisions

of

Utah's

worker's

compensation scheme evidenced the Legislature's intent to extend
worker's compensation benefits to "volunteers who were injured
during the course and scope of their voluntary labor." See id. at
51.

Therein, this Court ruled that "to extrapolate from . . .

particular provisions of [Utah's Worker's Compensation Act] that
all volunteers are eligible for worker's compensation is beyond the
scope of the commission's authority or ours" since "Utah's Worker's
Compensation Scheme is a purely statutory creation.

rAndl ftlhis

court cannot expand the statute to subjects not included in its
provisions."

Id. at 51 (some emphasis added).6

Just as in Olsen,

this Court has no basis upon which to expand the statutory scheme
created

by

Utah's

Legislature.

Nowhere

in

Utah's

Worker's

Compensation Act is a "gratuitous servant" status recognized and/or
6

Importantly, although the Court was not willing in that
case to hold that the volunteer was entitled to worker's
compensation benefits, it based its holding therein upon the
employee/employer analysis referenced above. Accordingly, even
though plcLintiff has titled himself defendant's "voluntary
worker," such a title is irrelevant since application of the
employer/employee analysis in Point I demonstrates the existence
of an employment relationship.
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defined.

And any change in the statutory scheme is for Utah's

legislature and not this Court to make.
In addition, the cases plaintiff cites in urging this Court to
judicially legislate and adopt his "gratuitous servant" argument
are

distinguishable

statutory

schemes

performed

purely

or
or

inapposite.
factual

contributory

Many

situations
effort

involve

where

without

the

different
employee

receiving

any

remuneration. See, e.g., Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 160 P.2d 94
(Cal. App. 1945), vacated, 167 P.2d 729 (1946) (plaintiff performed
contribution to war effort where statute required payment to be
considered an employee); Fernguist v. San Francisco Presbetery, 313
P.2d

192 (Cal. App. 1957) (no benefit received and no pledge

offered); Ferrell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 288 P.2d 492
(Ariz. 1955)
services

only

(no compensation awarded and plaintiff performed
as patriotic

citizen).

Other cases

cited by

plaintiff are distinguishable given the applicable statutes. See,
e.g., Ferrol v. Liapold Sinsheimer Estate, 176 N.E. 817 (N.Y. 1931)
(wages not paid and gratuities are not compensation) ; Harris v.
Seiavitch, 9 A.2d 375 (Pa. 1939) (plaintiff allowed to bring action
in trespass); Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 637 P.2d 846 (N.M. App.
1981) (statute required that employees earn money; and there was a
no remuneration policy in effect); Frederick v. Mens Reformatory,
203 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1973) (by statutory definition prisoners did
not

perform

voluntary

service);

Rensing

v.

Indiana

State

University, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (scholarships were not
remuneration under the statute). Such cases are in direct contrast
to the facts of this case.
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Also, although plaintiff cites small portions of Professor
Larson's

treatise

allegation

that

on

the

worker's

compensation

"gratuitous

servant"

to

support

category

his

might

be

acknowledged in some states, Professor Larson does not actually
recognize the clear independence of such a status although he
summarily

defines

gratuitous

servants

thusly:

"gratuitous

employees are not employees, since the element of "hiring" is
lacking; but payment may be found in anything of value, such as
boarding and lodging, and an agreement to pay is usually implied
when the parties have admitted to make an express agreement on
payment."

See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 47, at 8-284

(emphasis added). Further, Professor Larson notes that individuals
cannot be gratuitous servants if there exists some form of payment,
even if the payment does not come from the employer or necessarily
go to the employee.

See id. § 47.41, at 8-328.

And given the

facts above, even if this Court were to conclude that such a status
could

exist

absent

statutory

recognition,

it

is

clear

that

plaintiff was not a gratuitous servant since plaintiff received
compensation for services rendered in the form of valuable theater
tickets, other discounts and actual cash wages, which wages under
Professor
employer

Larson's view need not

have come

from plaintiff's

but could have come from plaintiff's

father as the

testimony evidenced. Thus, even under plaintiff's treatise claims
a gratuitous servant relationship did not exist.
Finally, numerous other cases conclude under comparable facts
that a "gratuitous servant" relationship cannot exist. See, e.g.,
Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 240 Cal. Rptr.
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811, 820 (Cal. App. 1987) (worker who acquired instruction and
training designed to teach him skills received remuneration within
meaning

of

Worker's

Compensation

Act

since

"definition

of

remuneration that is found in various dictionaries is not limited
to cash payment," but includes "reward, recompense, salary, or
compensation"); Barber v. Rich's, Inc., 90 S.E.2d 666, 669 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1955) (customer who assisted in obtaining tool at request of
defendant's employee was not servant or invitee and could not
recover for injuries since one who "voluntarily undertakes to
perform service for a master is a mere volunteer, and the master
does not owe him any duty, except not to injure him willfully and
wantonly after his peril is discovered"); Shea v. Gurnev, 39 N.E.
996, 997 (Mass. 1895) (14 year old plaintiff who visited place of
employment to amuse himself by assisting defendant's employees and
received injuries could not recover from defendant employer since
defendant owed plaintiff "no duty, except to abstain from injuring
him by active misconduct"); Duschnik v. Deco Restaurants, 276 N.Y.
439, 12 N.E.2d 536 (1983) (employer not liable for injuries caused
by volunteer who came to work to help employee and used employer's
machine furnished for use of employees). And in Lawson v. Lawson,
415 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1967) that court noted that when the employer
father paid no wages or regular compensation to the son and the son
received only his regular allowance, an employee relationship
nevertheless existed between the father and son since
even as the master-servant relationship may exist
notwithstanding the fact that the servant neither expects
nor is entitled to receive any compensation, so payment
of wages or compensation, although usually incident to an
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employer/employee
relationship,
essential element thereof.

is

not

always

an

All of this is not to suggest that, in the
performance of every trivial or occasional act of
assistance by a minor child in connection with a parent's
business operation, such child becomes an "employee"
within the contemplation and coverage of the Compensation
Law. But the uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony in
this case was to the effect that, although [the infant]
did not work every day, he nevertheless made a hand as a
workman in his father's business, so that, after his
accident, he was "replaced" by another male workman who
was paid [to do the work] . . . ; that claimant was "in
the service of" his father, i.e. he was engaged in the
"performance of labor for [his father's] benefit." and
that such service was both controllable and controlled by
the father.
Id. at 318-19 (citations omitted).
In this case, plaintiff was not a gratuitous servant even if
this Court were to acknowledge that such a status can exist in Utah
without support in statute.

Plaintiff received compensation for

his services and benefitted defendant thereby.

In fact, as noted

in the record, but for the directions of plaintiff's

father

defendant would have filed an employee injury application for
plaintiff with the Utah Industrial Commission. Plaintiff's father
and plaintiff himself acknowledged that plaintiff had received
compensation,
plaintiff's

that
father

in

his

capacity

supervised

as

plaintiff

defendant's
and

that

manager
plaintiff

regularly performed work for defendant, which work had to be
performed

by defendant's

other employees

after plaintiff was

injured.
Since Utah law does not recognize a "gratuitous servant"
status in this case, and since plaintiff failed to raise this
argument below, this Court should not follow plaintiff's urgings
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and adopt a "gratuitous servant" status where none otherwise exists
in the law.
CONCLUSION
Given the evidence before this Court and that presented at
trial below, there is no reasonable basis upon which to support a
judgment in plaintiff's favor and thus the trial court's directed
verdict must be sustained given (1) an analysis of Utah's worker's
compensation scheme to the facts of this case, (2) the issues
plaintiff raised below, and (3) even those issues plaintiff raises
for the first time on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this
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APPENDIX A
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1985).
35-1-42.
Employers enumerated and defined—
Regularly employed—Independent
contractors.
The
following shall constitute employers subject to the
provisions of this title:

(2) Every person, firm and private corporation,
including every public utility, having in service one or
more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment, under
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written
•

• . •

The term "regularly" as herein used shall include
all employments in the usual course of the trade,
business, profession or occupation of the employer,
whether continuous throughout the year or for only a
portion of the year.
Where any employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work
he retains supervision or control, and such work is a
part or process in the trade or business of the employer,
such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning
of this section, employees of such original employer.
Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
performance of work as an independent contractor shall be
deemed an employer within the meaning of this section.
The term "independent contractor," as herein used, is
defined to be any person, association or corporation
engaged in the performance of any work for another, who,
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all
that pertains to the execution of the work, is not
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is
engaged only in the performance of a definite job or
piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (Supp. 1985).
35-1-43.
"Employee," "workmen," and "operative"
defined—Mining lessees and sublessees—Partners and sole
proprietors—Real estate agent or broker. (1) The words

"employee," "workmen," and "operative," as used in this
chapter, mean:

(b) every person in the service of any employer as
defined in Subsection 35-1-42(2), who employs one or more
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or
in or about the same establishment, under any contract of
hire, express or implied, oral or written, including
aliens, and minors whether legally or illegally working
for hire, but not including any person whose employment
is casual and not in the usual course of trade, business,
or occupation of his employer.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60.
35-1-60.
Exclusive remedy against employer, or
officer,
agent
or
employee—Occupational
disease
excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee
of the employer and the liabilities of the employer
imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all
other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow,
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of
or arising out of his employment, and no action at law
may be maintained against an employer or against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any
accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in
this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his
dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial
commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within
the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease
Disability Act, as amended.

